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Studies into open source software (OSS) development projects have hitherto focused on the question of why people are 
motivated to contribute to these projects, thereby assuming that motivational factors are the same across all types of OSS 
projects. In this study we challenge this assumption by investigating the question what motivates developers’ selection of an 
OSS project depending on the level of license restrictiveness. Hereto we first develop a comprehensive multi-theoretical 
model of developers’ motivations based on a literature review of foundational theories of motivations from multiple 
disciplinary backgrounds. Second, through data from 159 surveys, we show that developers’ motivations indeed influence the 
selection of projects to which they contribute based on license restrictiveness. Drawing upon our findings, we propose a 
theoretical process model of project selection. This model helps to understand the relations between motivations, project 
selection and level of contribution and can be applied in future research. 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Existing literature on Open Source Software (OSS) communities has frequently addressed the question of why people 
participate in and contribute to these communities without distinguishing between different OSS projects. Hence, the 
literature up to date seems to assume the existence of a general set of motivational factors that are the same across different 
types of OSS projects. In this paper, we propose that OSS projects differ, hence, that developers might have different 
motivations for selecting the particular OSS project they contribute to.  
One important variable for distinguishing between different types of OSS projects is license restrictiveness. License 
restrictiveness is a significant differentiator since (1) it is one of the most fundamental configurations in an open source 
project (Colazo and Fang, 2009) and (2) it influences the entire OSS development process. Previous studies have suggested 
that license restrictiveness influences the level of contribution of developers to the project (Fresthman and Gandal, 2007; 
Colazo and Fang, 2009; Lerner and Tirole, 2005a), however, did not regard the role of license restrictiveness as a 
differentiating variable of OSS projects.  
In this study, we suggest that developers’ motivations to participate in and contribute to a particular OSS project may 
potentially differ depending on the license restrictiveness of OSS projects. In other words, the motivations to participate in an 
OSS project with a highly-restrictive license are not necessarily the same as the motivations to participate in an OSS project 
with a non-restrictive license.  
In order to answer the question of what motivates developers’ selection of a particular OSS project distinguished by license 
restrictiveness, this paper presents and tests a comprehensive multi-theoretical model of possible underlying motivations. 
Whereas previous models have been formulated to understand the motivations of people contributing to open-source 
communities (Hertel et al.2003), these models have not provided a comprehensive integration of existing theories of 
motivations, but have rather relied on a small set of motivational theories. Therefore, based on an extensive literature review, 
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this paper extends these existing models by incorporating a set of foundational theories of motivations from multiple 
disciplinary backgrounds. By broadening the theoretical focus, this comprehensive model helps us to capture the 
idiosyncrasies and complexities associated with the selection of a particular OSS project based on license restrictiveness.  
In order to test this multi-theoretical model, we analyzed data from 159 surveys of OSS developers from 88 different OSS 
projects. A better understanding of which individual motivations influence the selection of OSS projects distinguished by 
license restrictiveness might help to understand different individual preferences for different types of communities. This in 
turn could inform the design of OSS communities to attract particular individuals through different levels of restrictiveness.   
In short, this paper provides three contributions. First of all, we offer a comprehensive, multi-theoretical model of motivation 
that builds upon, yet extends existing models of innovation. Second, rather than assuming one general set of motivations for 
participating in OSS projects, we distinguish different motivations for different types of OSS projects, distinguished by 
license restrictiveness. Finally, based on the findings from this study, we offer a process model of the relations between 
motivations to participate, project selection and level of contribution as the basis for future research on OSS projects. We 
propose this model as the basis for an emerging motivation-based theory of project selection that applies not just to OSS 
projects but rather generalizes to other communities and organizations for open innovation, collaboration and sharing.  
In what follows, we first set the stage by describing OSS and OSS projects. Then we provide an extensive literature review of 
existing theoretical models of motivation, followed by a discussion of different OSS licenses. Based on the literature review 
of existing theories of motivation, we present our conceptual framework. Subsequently, following the discussion of the 
research design, we provide an overview of the results of our survey study. To conclude, we discuss our findings as well as a 
set of limitations and implications.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Open Source Software 
Open source software (OSS) is software of which the source code is released and disclosed under licensing terms that allow 
modified versions to be redistributed (Colazo and Fang, 2009). Due to the disclosure, anyone is free to re-use or amend the 
source code resulting in loosely-knitted communities of programmers that manage and develop the software (Hertel et al, 
2003). For the largest part, these project communities consist of programmers that do not receive a formal payment for their 
contributions (Hertel et al, 2003).  However, there are viable business models using OSS and certain developers do receive a 
direct income for programming OSS (Hars and Ou, 2002; Krishnamurthy, 2003).  
Over the last years, the number of OSS projects has grown and some projects became so successful that they compete with 
proprietary software programs (Colazo and Fang, 2009). Examples of well-known OSS are the Linux operating system, the 
Firefox web browser and the OpenOffice.org office production suite. 
A small selection of (Open Source) software projects is depicted in the timeline in Error! Reference source not found. to 
illustrate the maturing of OSS. In the beginning of (Open Source) software projects, the sharing of source code was highly 
open and informal. Yet, in the 1980s, more restrictive licenses for code sharing became popular. However, more recently, we 
can witness a movement in the direction of less restrictive licenses.  
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of Relevant (Open Source) Software Projects 
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Different License Types  
In this study we classify OSS projects by differentiating between different levels of license restrictiveness. Hereto we draw 
on the license restrictiveness classification by Lerner and Tirole (2005b) and Kaminski and Perry (2007) as presented in 
Table 3 below. Non-restrictive licenses (such as BSD) allow the Open Source code to be used in any project (including 
proprietary). Restrictive licenses (such as LGPL) do not allow the usage of licensed code in non-restrictive or proprietary 
licensed software, but allow the usage of its libraries in such software. Highly restrictive licenses (such as GPL) do not allow 
the code to be used in any project with a different license.  
 
Non-restrictive Restrictive Highly restrictive 
Apache Software License Apple Public Source License CeCILL License 
BSD license (original or revised) Common Public License GNU General Public License (GPL) 
Intel Open Source license GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) XFree86 License 
ISC License IBM Public License   
Microsoft Public License (Ms-PL) Microsoft Reciprocal License (Ms-RL)   
MIT or X11 License Mozilla Public License (MPL)   
Perl Artistic Nethack Public License   
PHP License QT Public License   
Python License Ruby License   
Zope Public License Sun Public License   
Public domain     
Table 1. Licenses categorized by restrictiveness (Lerner and Tirole, 2005b; Kaminski and Perry, 2007) 
 
Motivations of Open Source Developers 
In this section, we summarize a set of foundational theories of motivations from multiple social science disciplines to provide 
the basis for a comprehensive and integrated multi-theoretical model of motivations of OSS developers. Specifically, we 
draw upon Transaction Cost Economics (Ngwenyama and Bryson, 1999), Principal Agent Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Maslow, 1954), Self-Determination Theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000), Herzberg Two-Factor 
Model (Miner, 2005), Goal Setting Theory (Locke and Latham, 1990), Expectancy Theory (Locke and Latham, 1990), 
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), the Theory of Swift Trust (Meyerson et al., 1996; Jarvenpaa et al. 1998), 
Volunteer Function Inventory (Clary et al., 1998), Extended Klandermans Model (Hertel et al., 2003), and the VIST model 
(Hertel et al., 2003).  
Given the limited space, we summarize the underlying motivational constructs that we have deducted from existing models 
of motivation in Table 1 and 2 below. Table 1 summarizes constructs from models of motivation that have been previously 
used to understand motivations of OSS developers in particular. Table 2 displays constructs from existing theories of 
motivation in general, that is, which have not yet been applied for understanding the motivations of OSS developers. As the 
tables show, theories of motivation frequently refer to the same underlying constructs while using different terminology. 
Therefore, in these tables we delineate a set of foundational constructs of motivation that integrate the plethora of existing 
motivational construct terms from the literature through defining a set of consistent and distinct concepts. 
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Conceptual Framework 
Drawing on the insights from the theoretical discussion in this section, we further conceptualize the relationship between 
developers’ motivations and the selection of a particular OSS project distinguished by license restrictiveness in the model 
below (Figure 2). Using the existing literature as summarized in Table 1 and 2, we were able to hypothesize the nature of the 
relationship between only 6 out of the 14 motivational constructs and license restrictiveness (see Figure 3). From the theory 
we could not deduct the nature of the relationships between the remaining 8 motivational constructs and license 
restrictiveness, hence, the analysis of these relationships will be exploratory.  
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual model with hypothesized influences on license restrictiveness 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The target respondents of this study are developers in OSS projects. Within OSS projects, communication occurs primarily 
through mailing lists, therefore, we decided to distribute the survey invitation through these lists. The 88 mailing lists that we 
used for distributing the survey invitation were selected from popular (Open Source) software websites (e.g. Freshmeat and 
Download.com) and source code repositories (e.g. SourceForge and BerliOS). If the lists allowed non-members to send 
emails (37 mailing lists), the survey invitation was send directly. However, where this was not the case (51 mailing lists), a 
request was sent to the mailing list moderator to forward the survey invitation. From these 88 mailing lists, 47% used highly 
restrictive licenses, 27% restrictive licenses and 25% non-restrictive licenses.  
In order to operationalize the 14 motivational constructs—i.e. the independent variables—we adapted existing scales, as 
summarized in Table 42. In addition to these independent variables (Table 4), the survey included six control variables 
frequently used in behavior studies, which we adapted from existing literature, namely Project member competence (Kohli 
and Jaworksi, 1994), Creativity (Ganesan and Wietz, 1996), Innovativeness (Leavitt and Walton, 1988), Project commitment 
(Mowday, Steers and Potter, 1979), Self-efficacy (Hertel et al, 2003), and Autonomy in job (House, 1971). Furthermore, a 
series of descriptive variables regarding the demographics of survey respondents was included (see results section). 
Finally, the dependent variable, license restrictiveness, was measured using the classification of licenses from Lerner and 
Tirole (2005b), presented earlier in this paper (Table ). The construct is measured as a three point ordinal scale where non-
restrictive licenses are valued as 1, restrictive licenses as 2, and highly restrictive licenses as 3. The final study was preceded 
by a pilot study to test the feasibility of the instrument.   
 
 
                                                          
2See Appendix for a more extensive overview of survey scales and items 
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Parent-construct Construct/Scale Adapted from: (source and scale) 
Intrinsic 
Fun and 
enjoyment Hars and Ou (2002): Intrinsic motivation 
 Instrumentality Hertel et al (2003) 
Altruism Altruism Hars and Ou (2002): Altruism; Misje et al (2005): Value 
Community Reciprocity 
Li et al (2006): Obligation based motivation; Cox and Soldo (2004): Reciprocity; 
Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006): Social motivation 
 
Community 
identity Hars and Ou (2002): Altruism; Hertel et al (2003): Collective Identity 




Hertel et al (2003): Valance; Hertel et al (2003): Collective Motives; and one item 
self-developed 
 Ideology 
Li et al (2006): Obligation based motivation; Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006): Social 
motivation; Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006): Economic motivation 




Hars and Ou (2002): Future return; Li et al (2006): External identified regulation; 
Lakhani and Wolf (2003) 
 Self-marketing 
Hars and Ou (2002): Future returns; Li et al (2006): External identified regulation; 
Li et al (2006): External introjected regulation 
Recognition Peer recognition 
Hars and Ou (2002): Altruism; Pelletier et al (1995): External regulated; Li et al 
(2006): Introjected regulation 
 Reputation 
Lakhani and Wolf (2003); Hertel et al (2003): Reward; Bonaccorsi and Rossi 
(2006): Economic motivation 
Personal needs Personal needs 
Hars and Ou (2002): Personal needs; Hertel et al (2003): Reward; Bonaccorsi and 
Rossi (2006): Economic motivation 
Table 4. Survey scales and sources of independent variables 
 
RESULTS 
In what follows, we first present the descriptive statistics and findings from the exploratory factor analysis followed by the 
results from the regression analysis.   
The electronic distribution of the survey through relevant mailing lists resulted in 159 respondents. The total number of the 
mailing lists subscribers is unknown so the response rate cannot be calculated. The majority of developers (n=75) are 
between 20 and 34 years old, 98% (n=156) are male, and 79% (n=126) hold an associate or higher degree. One in five earns 
more than US$110,000, and just over half of the respondents have a higher than median income. Of the respondents, 53% is 
paid for programming, working either as salaried or contracted programmer. More than half of the respondents (n=87) 
originate from the EU and one in five from the US. Developers mostly use GNU/Linux or a BSD-variant as the operating 
system for their main computer (89%), followed by Apple’s MacOS X, which uses a BSD-variant as the base layer.  
The respondents release their code to projects licensed under different levels of restrictiveness. Sixty percent do that under 
highly restrictive licenses, with 58% working with GNU General Public License (GPL) and 2% with other highly restrictive 
licenses. Thirty percent contribute to projects licensed as non-restrictive of which the BSD license is the largest group (21%). 
A small group (10%) works under a restrictive license, where 8% works under GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL).  
 
                                                                                                                                      Toward a Motivation-Based Theory of Project Selection  
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Detroit, Michigan August 4th-7th 2011 9 
A factor analysis was performed to check the validity of the constructs of our model. The reliability of the scales is presented 
in Table 5 below. Due to limited reliability certain constructs (*) are treated with care or are excluded (**) from the analysis. 
 
Constructs Cronbach's α  Constructs Cronbach's α 
Fun and enjoyment 0.740  Peer recognition 0.670 
Instrumentality 0.855  Reputation 0.853 
Altruism 0.798  Personal needs 0.519* 
Reciprocity 0.641  Controls  
Community identity 0.804  Project member competence 0.815 
Trust 0.584*  Self-efficacy 0.753 
Project goal evaluation 0.791  Decision making 0.643 
Ideology 0.830  Creativity 0.616 
Direct income 0.891  Job scope 0.562 
Enhancing Human Capital 0.686  Innovativeness 0.478** 
Self-marketing 0.823  Project commitment 0.430** 
Table 5. Scale Reliability 
 
Tests for normality and multicollinearity ensured that the assumptions underlying the regression analysis were met. The 
model, which was analyzed through a linear regression analysis, proved significant (F14,158 = 2.57, p < 0.05). The results 
revealed five factors as significant predictors of the selection of projects based on license restrictiveness (marked by * in table 
6), accounting for 25% of the variance (R2 = .25; R2adj = 15%). Adding control variables to the model did not significantly 
increase the explained variance, hence, were excluded for reasons of parsimony. Furthermore, we investigated the influence 
of income by performing a t-test between unpaid and paid developers, which showed no significant differences in group 
means.  
Predictors  β SE Std. β t Sign. level 
Constant) 1.906 .963  1.978 .050 
Fun and enjoyment .008 .151 .005 .051 .959 
Instrumentality .215 .084 .234 2.567 .012* 
Altruism  .230 .112 .216 2.058 .042* 
Reciprocity .023 .099 .020 .230 .819 
Community identity .215 .174 .140 1.237 .219 
Trust  .165 .102 .145 1.622 .108 
Project goal evaluation -.327 .130 -.231 -2.512 .013* 
Ideology  .061 .116 .056 .532 .596 
Direct income  .066 .078 .082 .847 .399 
Enhancing Human Capital -.318 .215 -.195 -1.478 .142 
Self-marketing  .352 .152 .336 2.313 .023* 
Peer recognition .090 .119 .083 .755 .452 
Reputation -.425 .145 -.379 -2.937 .004* 
Personal needs  -.103 .143 -.068 -.720 .473 
Table 6 - Regression coefficients with the license restrictiveness scale as dependent variable  
                                                                                                                                      Toward a Motivation-Based Theory of Project Selection  
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Detroit, Michigan August 4th-7th 2011 10 
Of the significant predictors, three have a positive effect on license restrictiveness, namely instrumentality, altruism and self-
marketing, and two have a negative effect, namely project goal evaluation and reputation. The motivation to participate thus 
affects the selection of a particular to an OSS project based on its license restrictiveness. In what follows, we will briefly 
discuss these five significant predictors.  
Altruism: The influence of altruism as a motivational factor of developers was hypothesized to be positive on the selection 
of OSS projects based on their license restrictiveness. The developer motivated by altruistic needs to contribute to the project 
to help others by sharing code, helping others with problems and teaching others to code. It was hypothesized that the 
developer would want to protect these efforts by choosing projects with restrictive licenses. The results of the survey create 
more confidence in that this relationship is indeed positive: developers holding altruism as a motivational factor prefer 
projects with more restrictive licenses. 
Instrumentality: We find a reasonable positive influence of instrumentality on the selection of OSS projects with more 
restrictive licenses. This construct represents the perceived importance and influence of the individual in the project. The 
discussed theories seem to give no suggestion to explain this influence. However, this finding is similar to the results for 
altruism. Thereby we can argue that if individuals perceive their contribution to be very significant they prefer to protect 
these efforts by choosing projects with restrictive licenses.  
Project Goal Evaluation: We explored the direction of the relationship due to the lack of theory underlying this relationship. 
We find that the perceived value of project goals has a significant negative affect on the selection of open source projects 
differentiated by license restrictiveness. This implies that developers who value project goals prefer projects with less 
restrictive licenses. Even though we cannot rely on existing theory for explaining this relationship, it may be because 
developers are more committed to the goals of projects released under less restrictive licenses. This relationship should 
therefore be investigated further in future research. 
Self-marketing: We find a significant positive effect on the selection of projects based on license restrictiveness. This means 
that developers holding self-marketing as a motivational factor prefer projects with restrictive licenses. This result contradicts 
the findings of Lerner and Tirole (2005b) that time and effort devoted by developers serving as a tool for self-marketing is 
greater under non-restrictive licenses. Therefore it supports the previous findings related to altruism and instrumentality; if 
plan to devote time and effort they prefer to protect these efforts by choosing projects with restrictive licenses. 
Reputation: We find that reputation has a significant negative effect on the license restrictiveness, meaning that developers 
who aspire a higher reputation choose for OSS projects with less restrictive licenses. Based on the previous finding on self-
marketing we would expect that developers motivated by reputation would also prefer projects with more restrictive licenses. 
Nevertheless projects with non-restrictive licenses (such as BSD) mention explicitly who coded what on an individual basis, 
while under highly restrictive licenses (such as GPL) contributors are mentioned as a group in a general overview of 
contributors (Colazo and Fang, 2009; Freshtman and Gandal, 2007). Thus projects with less restrictive licenses help to 
enhance reputation.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The results of a regression analysis for answering our research question—what motivational factors influence the selection of 
an OSS project with a particular level license restrictiveness—showed that instrumentality, altruism, self-marketing, project 
goal evaluation and reputation significantly affect the selection of OSS project based on license restrictiveness. 
Based on a critical reflection on the results it could be argued that analyzing the motivations to select OSS projects based on 
license restrictiveness might actually conceal the importance of popularity3 instead of license restrictiveness for selecting 
projects. For example, most popular projects, such as the Linux kernel, OpenOffice.org and MySQL, are all developed under 
the highly restrictive GPL license. Hence it could be assumed that developers motivated by altruism, instrumentality and self-
marketing projects with highly restrictive licenses because of their popularity. This should be investigated in future research. 
Additionally, we should explore other analytical procedures for testing the model and alternative sampling strategies for more 
detailed between groups analyses. Finally, through exploring other variables than license restrictiveness (e.g. size, success 
and age) that differentiate OSS projects we can obtain a more detailed understanding of developers’ motivations for selecting 
projects. 
                                                          
3
 Popularity could be measured by project activity, number of involved developers and number of project-related web sites 
(see http://www.blackducksoftware.com/news/releases/2011-01-07) 
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Drawing on the insights of the study we propose a motivation-based process model for understanding the relationships 
between motivations, selection of projects and level of contribution (see Figure 3). With respect to the main relationships in 
this process model, this study focused on the relationship between motivations and project selection (arrow 1), which to the 
best of our knowledge has not been analyzed before. Previous studies on OSS projects have already shed light onto arrow 2. 
Future research should further explore the relationship between motivations and project selection (arrow 1) as well as analyze 
how contributions fuel future motivations to participate (arrow 3). With respect to the main constructs in this model, we 
offered a comprehensive theoretical model of motivations. However, more research is needed to explore project selection 
criteria beyond license restrictiveness as well as different forms of contributions. Within the context of OSS projects we can 
distinguish developers who initiate projects, those who manage projects and those who write code.  It can be anticipated that 
different contributions stimulate different types of future motivations.  
This model implies that future research should pay attention to the f i t  between individual motivations and project 
characteristics. In particular in the context of online communities where participation is voluntary, individuals have a choice 
to which project they want to contribute and this choice will be based on individual motivations and preferences. For 
example, an individual motivated by the desire for fun and enjoyment will sign up to Facebook, whereas an individual 
motivated by the desire for self-marketing or reputation enhancement will join LinkedIn.  
Despite the limitations to generalizing beyond the context of analysis, we believe the same principles of fit between 
motivation and project selection may also apply to the relationships between stakeholders and organizations. Primary 
stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers, will increasingly select organizations based on the fit between personal 
preferences and organizational characteristics (e.g. sustainable practices, transparency and innovativeness). Hence, we argue 
that this process model represents an emerging theory of project (or organization) selection with practical repercussions for 
how people select projects and organizations based on their individual motivations. 
 
 
Figure 3. A Motivation-Based Process Model for Project Selection 
 
To conclude, this paper provides three main contributions. First, by delineating a set of foundational constructs of motivation, 
we provide a comprehensive multi-theoretical model of motivation that integrates the plethora of existing motivational 
constructs from the literature. Second, the results of the survey show that developers’ motivations determine which OSS 
project they contribute to depending on the license restrictiveness of that project. Whereas previous studies have analyzed 
motivations to contribute to OSS projects in general, this study reveals that it cannot be assumed that the motivations to 
contribute to OSS projects are the same for all projects. Third and most importantly, the process model presented above can 
be applied for understanding the relationships between motivations, selection of project and level of contribution. This 
process model offers an emerging theory of selection of projects and organizations that is not just useful in the context of 
OSS projects, but could potentially be applied in future research on organizations and communities of all sorts.  
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